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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jonathan Earl Folk appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd 
conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen years. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Charity Reed had three children, including a son, "TR.," who, at the time 
of Folk's crime, was five years old. (Tr., p.203, Ls.8-24.) Charity and her 
husband (Brian Reed), Charity's grandmother, and Charity's three children, lived 
in the grandmother's home. (Tr., p.203, L.20 - p.204, L.10.) During the 2007 
Christmas period, Charity's aunt's adult stepson, Blaine Blair, was allowed by the 
grandmother to stay at the residence against Charity's wishes. (Tr., p.204, L.14-
p.205, L.22; p.219, L.7 - p.220, L.7.) Jonathan Folk was a distant relative of 
Charity whom she had met once prior to seeing him when he dropped Blair off at 
Charity's house a couple days before Christmas. (Tr., p.206, L.20 - p.207, L.4.) 
On Christmas day, Charity drove her cousin's children to their mother's 
home, and when she returned home Folk was there. (Tr., p.204, Ls.19-21; 
p.205, L.15 - p.206, L.6.) Also present at Charity's home was April Prock and her 
two children. (Tr., p.205, Ls.19-22.) Charity went into the kitchen for ten to 
fifteen minutes to help her grandmother prepare dinner, and when she came out, 
she asked her husband where TR. was because dinner was ready. (Tr., p.207, 
L.25 - p.209, L.23.) Charity's husband said he thought TR. was in his bedroom 
playing, and as Charity walked about the corner through the door to the boys' 





Charity saw Folk kneeling down in front of T.R. with T.R.'s legs around him, and 
Folk's hands on T.R.'s hips. (Tr., p.209, L.23 - p.210, L.12.) 
Charity asked Folk what he was doing, and he told her they were just 
playing. (Tr., p.210, Ls.14-15.) T.R. began to laugh and went right to Charity as 
Folk backed away. (Tr., p.210, Ls.15-17.) Folk stood in the bedroom for a 
couple of minutes, then he left after the other children entered the bedroom. (Tr., 
p.210, Ls.20-22.) Charity asked TR., "what were you guys doing in here?" and 
T.R. said they were just playing. (Tr., p.210, Ls.23-25.) Charity went to the living 
room and after noticing Folk trying to play with the rest of the children and 
attempting to pick up her four-year-old son, she told April she had a bad feeling 
that something just happened. (Tr., p.211, Ls.5-20.) Right before Blair and Folk 
left the house, Folk handed TR. -- but not any of the other children -- some 
candy and change out of his pocket. (Tr., p.212, Ls.5-11.) After Blair and Folk 
left, TR. "was kind of shying away from everybody," and was clinging to Charity, 
which was unusual. (Tr., p.218, Ls.11-24; p.385, Ls.13-17.) 
At 8:30 p.m., the children's usual bedtime, TR. did not want to go to his 
bed, but instead ended up sleeping with Charity's grandmother. (Tr., p.213, Ls.5-
14.) At about 4:00 the next morning, Charity was awoken by TR., who told her 
he had just had a nightmare, and when asked what it was about, he explained he 
had a "bad dream about what that guy did to me last night." (Tr., p.213, Ls.14-
18.) Later that morning Charity called the police. (Tr., p.213, L.23 - p.214, L.19.) 
While waiting for the police to arrive, Charity took T.R. aside and asked him what 
happened the night before, and he told her "Johnny" (T.R.'s name for Folk) put 
2 
his mouth on his (T.R.'s) penis. (Tr., p.215, Ls.1-5.) Charity did not know what 
to do, so she just hugged T.R. and held him. (Tr., p.215, Ls.5-7.) When T.R. 
asked Charity if he was going to be in trouble, she reassured him he would not, 
and told him he had done the right thing by telling her about the incident. (Tr., 
p.215, Ls.7-10.) A police officer arrived shortly thereafter. (Tr., p.215, Ls.1B-19.) 
According to T.R., when he and Folk went into his bedroom, just before 
his mother came into the room, he was laying down on his bed when Folk pulled 
his clothes half-way down "just where he could see [his] private," and put his 
mouth on T.R.'s private. (Tr., p.320, L.4 - p.322, L.B; p.347,Ls.5-7; p.349, Ls.10-
23.) T.R. explained: 
A. He took his mouth -- and when he took his mouth off, he 
went (sound). 
Q. He went (sound). Is that the sound that he made? 
A. Yeah. He went (sound). 
(Tr., p.322, Ls.15-19.) When T.R. tried to yell for his mother, Folk covered his 
mouth.1 (Tr., p.325, Ls.2-5; p.341, Ls.20-24; p.342, Ls.3-B.) 
Folk was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., Vol. 
1, pp.56-57.) At the pre-trial conference, Folk asked for permission to represent 
himself and was allowed to do so -- with standby counsel appointed to "address 
any particular technical or legal issues there might be." (Supp. Tr., p.15, L.19-
p.16, L.1; p.1B, Ls.20-24; p.22, Ls.19-25.) The court noted that Folk's request 
opened up potential issues as to how T.R. could be appropriately cross-
1 During trial, the state presented testimony by three witnesses that had either 
been victims of, or witnesses to, prior bad sex acts committed by Folk upon them 
or others as children years earlier. (See generally Tr., pp.402-454.) 
3 
examined by Folk himself. (Supp. Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.19.) The state filed a 
motion requesting cross-examination of TR. be conducted by Folk's standby 
counselor, alternatively, without visual contact through audio technology. (R., 
Vol. 1, pp.116-117.) The trial court granted the state's motion, and permitted 
TR. to testify in a separate room through closed circuit video outside the direct 
presence of Folk. (R., Vol. 2, pp.196-204; Tr., p.311, L.12 - p.315, L.2.) 
Additionally, the trial court ruled that TR. could only be cross-examined by Folk 
submitting written questions to his standby counsel to ask. (R., Vol. 2, pp.196-
204.) 
The jury convicted Folk on the lewd conduct charge (R., Vol. 2, pp.366-
367), and he was ordered to serve a fixed life sentence (R., Vol. 2, pp.312-313). 






















Folk states the issues on appeal as: 





Did the district court commit reversible error when it deprived 
Mr. Folk of his constitutional right to confront his accuser? 
Did the district court commit reversible error when it deprived 
Mr. Folk his constitutional right to represent himself? 
Did the district court deny Mr. Folk's rights to due process of 
law, by incorrectly instructing the jury that Mr. Folk could be 
guilty of lewd conduct by making any type of sexual advance 
when it refused to remove !let cetera" from the clarifying 
instruction? 
5) Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Folk's right 
to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of serious 
errors throughout his trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1S.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Folk failed to demonstrate any violation of his statutory or 
constitutional right to a speedy trial? 
2. Has Folk failed to show that his constitutional right to confront his accuser 
was violated? 
3. Has Folk failed to show that his constitutional right to self-representation 
was violated? 
4. Has Folk failed to demonstrate the trial court erred by its answer to the 
jury's question about Instruction Sixteen? 




















Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Violation Of His Statutory Or Constitutional 
Rights To A Speedy Trial 
A. Introduction 
Folk contends his statutory (I.C. § 19-3501) and state and federal 
constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated by the delay of his jury trial to 
approximately one year after charges were filed against him in district court. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-37.) 
Folk's constitution-based speedy trial arguments were not preserved for 
appellate review because he failed to present them to the district court as 
constitutional claims and the trial court did not rule on such claims. Folk's claim 
that his statutory speedy trial right was violated should be rejected because: (1) 
the issue is moot because the only remedy possible was dismissal without 
prejudice and a fair trial -- the latter of which Folk has already received; (2) Folk 
requested one continuance of his trial date within the six-month speedy trial 
period, therefore his statutory speedy trial right was no longer in effect; and (3) 
there was "good cause" to continue Folk's trial date beyond the statutory six-
month period. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The issue of speedy trial rights is a mixed question of fact and law. 
Deference is given to factual determinations which are supported by substantial 












law to the facts found by the trial court. State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 269, 
954 P.2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Folk Has Failed To Preserve The Argument That His State And Federal 
Constitutional Rights To A Speedy Trial Were Violated 
Folk asks this Court to vacate his conviction and dismiss his case with 
prejudice, arguing that he was deprived of his state and federal constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-37.) This Court must decline to 
consider the merits of Folk's claim, however, because it was not preserved for 
appellate review. 
It is well settled that issues not raised below will generally not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 888-89, 
136 P.3d 350, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,824 
P.2d 123, 126 (1992). It is equally well settled "that in order for an issue to be 
raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis 
for an assignment of error." State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395, 401, 925 P.2d 
399, 405 (Ct. App. 1996). A claim of a speedy trial violation presents a 
particularly fact intensive inquiry. State v. Garcia, 126 Idaho 836, 838, 892 P.2d 
903, 905 (Ct. App. 1995). For this reason, a speedy trial issue that is not argued 
to or considered by the court below will not be considered on appeal. kL; 
Averett, 142 Idaho at 889, 136 P.3d at 360; Amerson, 129 Idaho at 401, 925 
P.2d at 405. As explained by the Court of Appeals in Garcia: 
[A]n alleged violation of speedy trial rights is particularly 
inappropriate for consideration for the first time on appeal because 
the appellate record, where no speedy trial challenge was raised 

















claim raises mixed questions of fact and law, and determining 
whether the right to a speedy trial has been infringed requires 
application of the balancing test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 
This balancing test involves consideration of the length of the delay 
of the trial, the reason for the delay, the defendant's diligence in 
asserting his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The factors to 
be considered in this balancing process often present factual 
issues, particularly with respect to the reasons for the delay and 
whether the defendant has suffered prejudice. If a motion for relief 
based on speedy trial rights was not asserted before the trial court, 
the State has received no opportunity to present evidence or 
otherwise make a record addressing those issues, and the trial 
court has not resolved factual issues in conducting the balancing 
test. Therefore, when the defendant asserts a speedy trial violation 
for the first time on appeal, the appellate court generally has neither 
factual findings of the trial court to review nor an adequate record 
upon which the appellate court could determine whether the Barker 
v. Wingo factors weigh in favor of the defendant or the state. 
Garcia, 126 Idaho at 838, 892 P .2d at 905 (internal citations omitted). See a/so 
Averett, 142 Idaho at 889,136 P.3d at 360. 
In this case, Folk failed to file a motion to dismiss based upon an alleged 
violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights, and never mentioned them to the 
district court. Folk made no mention of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), 
and he did not otherwise present argument on or ask the district court to consider 
the Barker v. Wingo factors to determine whether they weighed in favor of or 
against a finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation. Having failed to do so, 
Folk not only deprived the district court of the opportunity to make factual findings 
or rule upon such issues as the reasons for any pre-trial delay or whether Folk 
was prejudiced by such delay, he also deprived the state of its opportunity to 





















Folk seems to concede he did not object to any trial delays based on his 
constitutional rights to a speedy trial. (See Appellant's Brief, p.31.) Instead, he 
argues that although most issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, 
"[a]n exception to this rule, however, has been applied by this Court when the 
issue was argued to or decided by the trial court." (Id., (emphasis in Appellant's 
Brief), quoting State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998).) 
Folk implies that the trial court's findings of "good cause" to continue the trial 
settings (see Tr., p.70, Ls.2-3; p.79, L.3) were rulings on his constitutional rights 
to a speedy trial. However, "good cause" is an obvious reference to the finding 
required to show compliance with the statutory speedy trial right under I.C. § 19-
3501. The trial court did not mention, much less rule upon, Folk's constitutional 
speedy trial rights. Folk cannot rightfully contend, as he does, that he is entitled 
to present his constitution-based speedy trial issues on appeal because they 
were "decided by the trial court." (See Appellant's Brief, p.31; quoting DuValt, 
131 Idaho at 553,961 P.2d at 644.) 
Because Folk failed to present his speedy trial issues as constitutional 
issues below, and because the trial court did not make an adverse ruling in 
regard to such rights, Folk's constitutional speedy trial issues cannot be 



















D. Folk Has Failed To Show His Statutory Speedy Trial Right Was Violated 
1. Folk's Claim That The District Court Violated His Statutory Speedy 
Trial Right Is Moot 
Folk argues that the district court violated his statutory right to a speedy 
trial under I.C. § 19-3501. This claim is moot because, even assuming there 
might be merit to the claim, no relief can be granted. 
The mootness doctrine precludes review when '''the issues presented are 
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'" 
Idaho Schools For Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. Of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 
281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 
816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). "An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real 
and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." 
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327, 2010 WL 1632625 *2 (2010) 
(citations omitted). Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial decision 
would not result in any relief. Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524, 148 P.3d 
1267, 1270 (2006) (citing State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 
1131 (2004)). 
Where, as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a 
statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice. See I.C. §§ 19-
3501, 19-3506. Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of 
a statutory speedy trial violation, the state could have simply re-filed the charges 
and proceeded to trial against Folk in a new criminal action. As explained in 


















· .. [A] violation of Section 19-3501 does not necessarily implicate 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. ... 
Further, Davis's contention that allowing the state to refile a 
charge alleging the same offense as the dismissed charge violated 
her right to due process is without support in the record. Statutes 
of limitation, which provide predictable, legislatively-enacted limits 
on prosecutorial delay, provide the primary guarantee against 
bringing overly stale criminal charges. United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783, 789, ... (1977). Nonetheless, statutes of limitation 
do not fully define a defendant's right with respect to the events 
occurring prior to filing criminal charges. Id. The Due Process 
Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive 
delay. Id. The filing of a subsequent criminal action following 
dismissal of the original criminal action after preliminary 
proceedings is not a per se violation of due process. Stockwell v. 
State, 98 Idaho 797, 805, 573 P.2d 116, 124 (1977). However, the 
dismissal and refiling of criminal complaints by the prosecutor, 
when done for the purpose of harassment, delay, or forum-
shopping, can violate a defendant's right to due process. State v. 
Bacon, 117 Idaho 679, 683, 791 P.2d 429, 433 (1990); Stockwell, 
98 Idaho at 806, 573 P.2d at 125. Before a due process violation 
can be found, the defendant must show that the preaccusation 
delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair 
trial and that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an 
advantage over the accused. State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 879, 
606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386, 
848 P.2d 440, 444 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The state relies upon the argument contained in section D (3), infra, to 
show that the trial court's resetting of Folk's trial date six weeks beyond the 
statutory speedy trial deadline did not adversely affect Folk's due process rights 
to a fair trial.2 Errors that do not affect the fairness of the trial, where one is had, 
are generally not reviewable on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 
500, 660 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1983) (claim of error in preliminary hearing is not 
2 The relevant time frame for considering whether Folk's statutory speedy trial 
right was violated is based on the trial court's resetting of Folk's jury trial six 
weeks beyond the July 28, 2008, speedy trial deadline -- to September 8, 2008. 


















ground to vacate conviction after fair trial); Loomis v. Killeen 135 Idaho 607,613, 
21 P.3d 929, 935 (Ct. App. 2001) (claim of errors in preliminary parole hearing 
not reviewed where there was fair parole violation hearing). Because Folk has 
failed to show that the alleged violation of I.C. 19-3501 of having his trial set six 
weeks beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial deadline affected the fairness 
of his criminal proceeding or trial, his claim of error is moot. 
2. Folk's Request For A Continuance Within The Six-Month Statutory 
Period Made His Statutory Speedy Trial Right Inapplicable 
Folk was charged with lewd conduct, and for being a persistent violator, in 
an Information filed January 28, 2008 with the district court. 3 (R., Vol. 1, pp.19-
20.) Folk contends that the case against him should have been dismissed 
because he was not brought to trial within six months of the filing of the 
information, in violation of Idaho Code § 19-3501. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-37.) 
However, the record makes clear there was no violation of the speedy trial 
proviSions of that statute. Because the trial had been delayed on at least one 
occasion at Folk's request or consent, the speedy trial statute was not applicable. 
Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following 
cases: 
2. If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed 
upon his application, is not brought to trial within six 
3 The Information was later amended to charge lewd conduct with notice that, 
upon conviction, the state would seek to have Folk sentenced as a repeat sex 
offender and fall under the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. § 18-


















(6) months from the date that the indictment or 
information is filed with the court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The plain language of the statute states that the six-month limitation 
applies only to a defendant "whose trial has not been postponed upon his 
application." Id.; but see State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116 n.2, 29 P.3d 949, 
952 n.2 (2001) (not ruling on "whether the protection granted ... is waived ... 
only when such postponement caused the trial to be rescheduled beyond the six-
month period"). In this case, Folk moved for a two-week continuance of the May 
27, 2008 trial date in order to prepare for a motions hearing (Supp. Tr., p.31, 
Ls.2-3), and when advised that the new trial date would be June 23, 2008, Folk 
replied, "That's fine" (Supp. Tr., p.32, Ls.17-25). Therefore, the record 
establishes that Folk's own motion resulted in an almost one-month delay in his 
trial, a fact that alone is sufficient to take this case outside the provisions of Idaho 
Code § 19-3501. 
In State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83,88,844 P.2d 712,717 (Ct. App. 1992), 
the court addressed Wavrick's assertion that "his agreement to postpone the 
original trial date did not constitute a waiver of his speedy trial right under the 
statute because . . . he stated that postponement of the original trial date 
constituted only a limited waiver of his statutory speedy trial right." The court 
held: 
... I.C. § 19-3501 does not allow defendants to postpone their trial 
and at the same time maintain their statutory speedy trial rights. 
The language of I.C. § 19-3501 is clear in providing that once the 














defendant has waived the six-month time limit for speedy trial 
required by the statute. 
& In this case, once Folk agreed to postpone his trial date from May 2yth to 
June 23rd , he waived the six-month time limit set by I.C. § 19-3501 to bring his 
case to trial. He is thus precluded from asserting on appeal that his statutory 
right to proceed to trial within six months was violated. 
3. The District Court Correctly Determined There Was Good Cause 
To Continue Folk's Trial Beyond Six Months 
a. Law Relevant To Statutory "Good Cause" 
In State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532, 544 (Ct. App. 2010), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals explained the relevant law to determine whether a 
defendant's statutory speedy trial right has been violated: 
When a defendant who invokes his statutory speedy trial rights is 
not brought to trial within six months and shows that trial was not 
postponed at his request, the burden then shifts to the state to 
demonstrate good cause for the court to decline to dismiss an 
action. State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 38, 921 P.2d 206, 
215 (Ct. App. 1996). "Good cause" means that there was a 
substantial reason for the delay that rises to the level of a legal 
excuse. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P .3d 949, 952 
(2001); [State v.] Clark, 135 Idaho [255] at 260, 16 P.3d [931] at 
936 [2000]. Analysis of whether there was good cause for a 
statutory speedy trial violation is not simply a determination of who 
was responsible for the delay and how long the case has been 
pending. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952. Rather, the 
analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. Id. But the 
reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and 
a good cause determination may take into account the additional 
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 ... (1972). 
See Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. Thus, insofar as they 
bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay, a 
court may consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the 
defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice 
to the defendant. However, the reason for the delay lies at the heart 




















The ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been 
shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. A trial judge does not have unbridled 
discretion to find good cause, however, and on appeal we will 
independently review the lower court's exercise of discretion. Id. 
We first examine the reason for the delay and then address the 
remaining Barker v. Wingo factors as they apply in this case. 
Following the pattern set out in Moore, the reason for the continuance of 
Folk's trial beyond the six-month statutory period is the main focus of the "good 
cause" statutory inquiry -- while the remaining three Barker v. Wingo factors may 
be considered in determining the strength of that reason. 
b. The Trial Court Had Good Cause To Continue Folk's Trial 
Folk had the right, under I.C. § 19-3501 (2), to be brought to trial within six 
months of the filing of the Information. Since the Information in his case was filed 
January 28, 2008, the state had until July 28, 2008, to bring Folk to trial.4 The 
only continuance relevant in determining whether there was "good cause" to 
continue Folk's trial is the court's July 2, 2008 order which reset the trial beyond 
the statutory six-month period for the first time. See State v. Lundquist, 134 
Idaho 831, 833, 11 P.3d 27, 29 (2000) ("Once the trial has been postponed, the 
six-month statutory period no longer applies."); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 
116 n.2, 29 P.3d 949, 952 n.2 (2001) ("In Lundquist, however, the defendant's 
requested postponement caused the trial to be rescheduled beyond the six-
month period.") 
4 The trial court appears to have accepted the prosecutor's determination that 

















Here, the delay beyond the statutory six-month period from the filing of the 
Information was caused, in large part, by Folk's belated decision to represent 
himself against his lewd conduct charge. On May 14, 2008, about three and 
one-half months into his six-month statutory speedy trial period, Folk advised the 
court he wanted to represent himself, and his motion was granted. (Supp. Tr., 
p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.1; p.22, Ls.23-25.) The court noted that Folk's request 
opened up potential issues as to how the five-year-old victim could be 
appropriately cross-examined by Folk, and the prosecutor shared that concern. 5 
(Supp. Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.19.) 
Following the July 2, 2008, motions hearing, which included consideration 
of the state's motion to preclude Folk from personally cross-examining the victim, 
the trial court ordered a continuance because it needed time to render decisions 
on the motions raised. The court explained that a continuance was necessary 
due to the complexities of the issues, Folk's recent decision to represent himself, 
and Folk's insistence upon personally cross-examining the victim; the court 
stated: 
It's going to take me some time to review these issues. There's a 
lot of material that has been submitted. And these are really, at 
least in terms of this issue of the cross-examination and its 
implications to the trial and how the child is presented, there's not a 
lot of case law in Idaho, and it's kind of a first impression thing, and 
I want to make sure that I've got at least as close as I can get it to 
being right, which is going to take some time, which means our trial 
date as set now is going to have to be bumped. 
5 On June 10, 2008, the state filed a motion entitled, "Motion to Prohibit the 
Defendant from Personally Cross Examining the Young Child Victim," proposing 
cross-examination of the victim be by Folk's standby counsel, or alternatively, 













I'm looking at -- and I know this is not anybody's fault; it's 
just the way this case has developed. We have been taking 
movement [sic] on this case in terms of all of these things for 
several months now. And Mr. Folk is proceeding now on his own 
behalf, and that's -- and that has made things a little more 
complicated in terms of the technicalities of the trial, so we're going 
to have to move the trial. 
(Tr., p.67, LsA-23 (emphasis added).) The trial court asked Folk about setting 
his trial date on September 8, 2008 (Tr., p.69, Ls.2-3), putting his trial beyond the 
six-month period for the first time. Folk said he just had one question: "Does 
that affect my right to a speedy trial?" (Tr., p.69, LsA-6.) The court replied: 
Well, your right to a speedy trial is to be tried within six 
months of the Information, unless there's good cause otherwise. I 
am finding that because of the intricacies of this defense and the 
process of trying to work through the prosecution and the defense, 
it's really important for us to do this right, in order to afford you an 
opportunity to present a defense. I can't do it any other way. I've 
got to have some time here. 
(Tr., p.69, Ls.7-15.) 
Folk then asked, "And this is two months?" (Tr., p.69, L.16.) The district 
court reiterated: 
Well, it's the first time I can get to it. I mean, I don't have any 
time in August now. My August is just crammed, and I'm putting it 
as -- I'm going to put it on first. I can't -- well, let me put it this way. 
Once this is under advisement, I've got to have time to write an 
opinion. I'm not going to get the opinions out before the first of 
August. I will hope to have them shortly after the first of August, 
which gives you time to get the opinions and deal with them. And 
we will have trial on September 8th . I'm finding that there is good 
cause for the speedy trial issue. 


















The trial court had good cause to set Folk's trial beyond the statutory six-
month speedy trial date.6 The reason for the delay -- the trial court's need to 
prepare its decisions after the July 2 motions hearing in regard to how the victim 
would testify at trial -- was largely the result of Folk's late decision to represent 
himself and question the victim. See State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 
37, 921 P.2d 206, 214 (Ct. App. 1996) (actions of the defendant in filing a late 
suppression motion, the prosecutor, and the trial court's crowded calendar, all 
contributed to the delay). In addition to the trial court's valid reasoning for the 
continuance, a review of Folk's case in light of the three remaining Barker v. 
Wingo factors, as suggested in Moore, greatly favors a finding that Folk's 
statutory speedy trial right was not violated. See Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 
P.3d at 544. 
First, the date Folk's trial was continued to -- September 8th -- was six 
weeks beyond his speedy trial deadline (July 28th). See fn.3, supra. Six weeks 
is not a significant amount of time to continue a trial involving the serious charge 
Folk was facing, and for the reason stated by the trial court -- to prepare legal 
decisions on how the victim should testify in a lewd conduct case being defended 
by Folk pro se. As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the delay 
must be evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the defendant is 
standing trial: "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 
6 Folk may have acquiesced in continuing his trial beyond the six-month speedy 
trial date. See State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 845, 718 P.2d 1272, 1283 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (defendant's assertion of speedy trial right is significant to show that 
he has not acquiesced in delay.); State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 253, 658 
P.2d 920,924 (1983) (delays caused or consented to by the defendant constitute 












considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 
U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charge on which Folk was standing trial 
- lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen -- the length of the delay was not 
substantial and does not weigh in Folk's favor. 
In regard to the next Barker factor, the dialogue between Folk and the trial 
court at the conclusion of the July 2, 2008 motions hearing shows that Folk did 
not assert his right to a speedy trial. Folk merely asked the court if the proffered 
continuance would "affect" his right to a speedy trial, and after the court 
explained the reasons for finding good cause to continue the trial date, Folk 
replied, "All right. Thank you." (Tr., p.69, LsA-6; p.70, LA.) In the context of the 
constitutional speedy trial right, a defendant's assertion of his right is "entitled to 
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived 
of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,839,118 
P.3d 160, 171 (Ct. App. 2005). However, "failure to assert the right will make it 
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." .!sl Here, 
Folk's failure to assert his speedy trial right weighs in favor of a finding that his 
statutory speedy trial right was not violated. See State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 
845, 718 P .2d 1272, 1283 (Ct. App. 1986) (defendant's assertion of speedy trial 
right is significant to show that he has not acquiesced in delay.); State v. 
Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 253, 658 P.2d 920, 924 (1983) (delays caused or 
consented to by the defendant constitute waiver of statutory and constitutional 
speedy trial rights); see also State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,353,160 P.3d 1284, 
19 
1288 (Ct. App. 2007) (lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right 
weighs heavily against his contention that the right was violated). 
Applying the last Barker factor, Folk has failed to demonstrate -- nor likely 
could he -- that the continuance of his trial to a date a mere six weeks beyond the 
statutory speedy trial deadline caused him prejudice. His arguments on appeal 
(see Appellant's Brief, pp.33-35) -- based wholly on his trial being held in 
January, 2009 after subsequent continuances -- are irrelevant in determining 
whether the one continuance that placed his trial beyond the statutory speedy 
trial deadline (July 28th ) to September 8, 2008, caused him prejudice. See 
Lundquist, 134 Idaho at 833, 11 P.3d at 29; Young, 136 Idaho at 116 n.2, 29 
P.3d at 952 n.2. Folk claims he was prejudiced by having to go to trial in 
January, 2009, because by that time, T.R.'s memory had faded, and the state 
had time to get their 404(b) witnesses from out of state to testify at trial. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.33-35.) Neither allegation is remotely relevant in showing 
whether Folk's due process rights were prejudiced by the continuance of his trial 
date to September 8, 2008. 
In light of the valid reasons for the trial court's July 2, 2008, continuance of 
Folk's trial to a date six weeks beyond the statutory six-month speedy trial period, 
and in consideration of the length of the delay, Folk's failure to assert his speedy 
trial right when the continuance was being considered, and the lack of any 
possible prejudice to such continuance, Folk has failed to show any violation of 























Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Confront His Accuser 
Was Violated 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Folk contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront his victim, T.R., by: (1) permitting T.R.'s testimony to be done 
outside Folk's presence through closed circuit video; (2) ruling Folk could only 
cross-examine T.R. by submitting written questions for his standby counsel to 
ask; (3) modifying the permissible method of impeaching T.R. with his preliminary 
hearing testimony; and (4) limiting the duration of T.R.'s cross-examination. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.37-56.) 
Because Folk agreed that T.R.'s testimony could be presented outside his 
presence, any claim that the trial court erred in allowing T.R. to testify remotely 
was waived under the invited error doctrine. Even if considered, the trial court 
properly found that forcing 1.R. to testify in Folk's presence would cause 1.R. to 
suffer serious emotional trauma and adversely impact his ability to communicate. 
Folk's assertions that his right to confrontation was violated by the trial court's 
order that he cross-examine 1. R. by submitting written questions to his standby 
counsel, changing the way Folk could impeach T.R. with the preliminary hearing 
transcript, and prompting Folk to get through his cross-examination of 1.R., are 
not supported by any authority and are waived. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse 






















free review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. 
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v. 
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974,829 P.2d 861 (1992). 
C. Any Assertion That Folk's Confrontation Rights Were Violated Because 
T.R's Testimony Was Presented Outside Folk's Presence Is Waived 
Under The Invited Error Doctrine 
During the July 2, 2008 motions hearing, Folk agreed that TR's testimony 
could be conducted outside his presence. He stated: 
The defense does not object to the identity of the defendant 
being concealed from the witness. To ease the witness's 
testimony, they can either alter my voice and [sic] not show myself 
to the witness. 
(Tr., p.63, Ls.9-12.) 
The doctrine of invited error estops a party from asserting an error when 
his own conduct induced the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 
Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, a party may not 
complain of errors he has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudhill, 109 
Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985). Under the doctrine of invited error, 
Folk is precluded from claiming that the district court improperly ordered TR's 
testimony to be presented outside Folk's immediate presence. As Folk's 
appellate counsel seems to acknowledge, Folk waived his right to challenge on 
appeal the trial court's determination that TR.'s testimony would be done outside 

















("Whether or not Craig7 is still valid law was not technically preserved in the 
instant case because Mr. Folk may have conceded the issue"; p.58 ("Mr. Folk did 
not object to having the child concealed from him to eliminate any possible 
concern the State may have with his interaction with the child.").) Inasmuch as 
Folk agreed that T.R.'s testimony could be done outside his presence, Folk 
cannot complain that the trial court erred in permitting T.R. to testify that way. 
D. Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred In Determining T.R. Could 
Testify Outside. Folk's Presence Because He Would Suffer Serious 
Emotional Trauma And Adversely Impact His Ability To Communicate 
After a motions hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion on whether 
T.R. should testify outside the presence of Folk and whether Folk would be 
allowed to personally ask questions during T.R.'s cross-examination. (R., Vol. 2, 
pp.196-205.) Although, as discussed, Folk agreed to not be personally present 
during T.R.'s testimony (see Tr., p.63, Ls.9-12), the district court's written opinion 
covered the "presence" issue just as if Folk had objected. The relevant portions 
of the court's decision, although lengthy, reflect that the court reasonably applied 
the operative law to the relevant facts in ruling T.R. could testify by closed circuit 
video outside Folk's presence. The court explained: 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to 
"be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Supreme 
Court has said that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before 
the trier of fact." [Citations omitted.] 
7 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (child sexual abuse victims 
permitted to testify against alleged abuser out of his presence and outside of the 















The [C]ourt has "never held, however, that the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-
to-face meeting with witnesses against them at triaL" Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). The preference for face to face 
confrontation "must occasionally give way to considerations of 
public policy and the necessities of the case." Craig, 497 U.S. at 
849 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). 
When analyzing whether the preference for face to face 
consideration must give way, courts must determine whether using 
some procedure other than direct cross examination "is necessary 
to further an important state interest." Craig[,~97 U.S. at 852. 
The Craig court found that "a State's interest in the physical 
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be 
sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a 
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. at 853. 
The Craig court went on to determine that "if the State makes an 
adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child 
witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is 
sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that 
permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a 
defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the 
defendant." Id. at 855. 
Essential to the finding in Craig was that the trial court made 
a "case-specific finding of necessity." Id. at 860. Courts must 
determine that any trauma to the child is brought on by testifying in 
the presence of the defendant, not merely by testifying in the 
courtroom. Id. at 856. Craig requires trial courts to "hear evidence 
and determine whether use of [alternate procedures] is necessary 
to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to 
testify." 
In this case, the court has heard sufficient testimony to 
determine that forcing TR. to be cross examined in the presence of 
Defendant would cause 1. R. to suffer serious emotional trauma that 
would substantially impair TR.'s ability to communicate. 
Specifically Ms. Reed has testified that 1. R. has suffered from 
nightmares about Defendant,[8] and TR. himself has testified that 
8 The state has filed a motion to augment the record on appeal with the 
preliminary hearing transcript in Folk's case, which will be referred to as "Prelim. 























Defendant told T.R not to tell anyone about the incident.[9] Given 
these factors along with T.R's young age, the court concludes that 
there is clear and convincing evidence to support takin~ T.R's 
testimony by alternate means consistent with I.C. § 9-1805.[ 0] 
Allowing T.R to present his testimony through closed circuit 
television satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause. 
Defendant's standby counsel will have the opportunity to cross 
examine T.R in view of the jury. The procedure preserves 
Defendant's right of confrontation, in satisfaction of the 
requirements of the Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)] 
and Craig cases. 
(R, Vol. 2, pp.198-200.) 
Folk has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in finding T.R 
would suffer serious emotional trauma and substantially impair his ability to 
communicate. In addition to the factors noted by the court -- T.R's age, T.R 
suffered nightmares about the incident, and Folk warned T. R not to tell anyone, 
at 4:00 the morning after the incident, and said "he had a nightmare about what 
the guy did to him last night." (Prelim. Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.12; p.13, Ls.2-4.) 
9 T.R. testified at the preliminary hearing that Folk covered his mouth after the 
incident because he didn't want anyone to know "that he did it." (Prelim. Tr., 
p.40, Ls.6-11; see id., p.38, Ls.1-20.) The record before the trial court included 
two state memoranda indicating Folk told T.R not to tell the police. (R, Vol. 1, 
p.73 (in interview, T.R said "Folk told him not to tell the police."); p.129 (same).) 
10 I.C. § 9-1808, reads in relevant part: 
(1) In a criminal proceeding, the presiding officer may order the 
presentation of the testimony of a child witness by an alternative 
method only in the following situations: 
(b) A child witness' testimony may be taken other than in a 
face-to-face confrontation between the child and a defendant if the 
presiding officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
child would suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially 
impair the child's ability to communicate with the finder of fact 













the court was also aware that the nature of the allegation against Folk concerned 
a very personally embarrassing subject -- that Folk had oral-to-genital contact 
with T.R. (See R., Vol. 1, p.19.) Based on those factors, the trial court properly 
concluded that if TR. were forced to testify in Folk's direct presence, TR. would 
"suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially impair [his] ability to 
communicate," permitting TR. to testify outside Folk's presence. (R., Vol. 2, 
p.200.) 
E. Folk's Arguments That The Trial Court Violated His Sixth Amendment 
Right To Confrontation By Limiting The Manner And Duration Of His 
Cross-Examination Of TR. Are Not Supported With Authority And Should 
Not Be Considered On Appeal 
Folk also asserts the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation by (a) ruling Folk could only cross-examine TR. by submitting 
written questions for his standby counsel to ask, (b) modifying the permissible 
method of impeaching 1. R. by allowing relevant portions of his preliminary 
hearing transcript to be read into the record by the judge's law clerk (see Tr., 
p.335, Ls.15-20),11 and (c) limiting the duration of TR.'s cross-examination by 
prodding Folk to complete it before TR.'s attention was exhausted.12 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.51-56.) The only authority Folk provides in regard to these 
11 Folk claims the trial court originally instructed him "that a reader would be 
made available to TR. to attempt to impeach [TR.'s] testimony," but changed the 
rules in the middle of trial to allow "the prior testimony to be read into the record." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.53.) The state is unclear as to what difference Folk discerns 
between the trial court's two statements. 
12 The trial court told Folk that TR.'s "attention span has about had it, and we're 
going to get this done." (Tr., p.334, L.25 - p.335, L.1.) TR. fell asleep later 
during cross-examination. (Tr., p.348, Ls.2-4.) 
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issues is the general acknowledgement that a district court "has broad discretion 
to limit cross-examination to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 
issues or if the testimony is only marginally relevant." (Appellant's Brief, pp.51-
56; and p.52 (quoting State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852,187 P.3d 1227 (2008).) 
In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered. Earlier 
formulations of this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was 
not supported with argument and authority. A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not 
just if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error 
with argument but no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue 
on appeal. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted); see I.A.R. 35. 
Pursuant to Zichko, because Folk has failed to present authority in support of the 
three above-described issues he purports to raise on appeal, this Court should 
not consider them. 
III. 
Folk Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation 
Was Violated 
A. I ntrod uction 
Folk argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
represent himself at trial by ruling Folk could only cross-examine T.R. by 
submitting written questions for his standby counsel to ask. (Appellant's Brief, 



















written questions for standby counsel to ask during T.R.'s cross-examination did 
not violate Folk's right to represent himself. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will defer to findings of fact supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional requirements to the 
facts found. State v. Jennings, 122 Idaho 531, 533, 835 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Ct. 
App. 1992); see, e.g., State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 626, 873 P.2d 877, 880 
(1994); State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636,639-41,97 P.3d 1025, 1028-30 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (citing cases). The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of 
evidence, and its judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse 
of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 731-32,24 P.3d at 48-49; Zimmerman, 
121 Idaho at 974,829 P.2d 861. 
C. Folk Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred By Ruling That His 
Standby Counsel Would Personally Cross-Examine T.R. By Asking 
Questions Prepared By Folk 
After hearing argument on the state's motion to preclude Folk from 
personally cross-examining T.R. (Tr., p.61, L.14 - p.64 , L.11), the district court 
issued a written opinion granting the state's motion and requiring T.R.'s cross-
examination be done by Folk's standby counsel reading questions prepared by 
Folk (R., Vol. 2, pp.203-204.) The trial court reviewed and applied the 
appropriate law to the facts in Folk's case as follows: 
In addition to the right of confrontation, the Sixth Amendment 
also grants defendants an implied right to represent themselves at 
trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). This right is 





















to determine if unsolicited participation by counsel violates a 
defendants [sic] right of self representation: "First, the pro se 
defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he 
chooses to present to the jury ... Second, participation by standby 
counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to 
destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing 
himself." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). 
The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and the Idaho Supreme Court appear not to have 
considered limitations on a pro se defendant's right to personally 
cross examine a child victim in a sexual abuse case. 
Other jurisdictions have applied the Faretta, Craig, and 
McCaskle [sic] cases to similar situations as the one now before 
this court. In State v. Estabrook, 842 P.2d 1001 (Wash.CLApp. 
1993), a Washington state appellate court examined whether 
preventing a defendant in a sex abuse case from directly cross 
examining the developmentally delayed child victim violated the 
rights outlined in Faretta and McKaskle. In the Estabrook trial: 
[T]he trial court directed Estabrook to submit 
his cross examination questions in writing to the court. 
The judge then asked those questions after advising 
the jury that: 
At this time, as I have told you, Mr. 
Estabrook has the right of cross-
examination. But because of the fact 
that he is not represented by an 
attorney, I am going to be asking the 
questions that he has asked me to ask. 
... They are Mr. Estabrook's questions. 
During trial, the court gave Estabrook additional time 
after J.H.'s direct testimony to prepare his questions. 
In addition, the trial court allowed "Mr. Estabrook to 
ask all the questions he needs to ask," and refused to 
sustain any scope objections to Estabrook's proposed 
questions. 
Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1004. 
The appellate court found that this procedure satisfied the 
two part test in McKaskle by allowing the defendant to maintain 











perception that the defendant was representing himself. Id. at 
1006. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Fields v. Murray, 49 
F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995), also considered a Virginia case where a 
defendant was not allowed to personally cross examine the child 
victims in a sex abuse case. The defendant in Fields was 
represented by counsel throughout trial but requested that he be 
allowed to personally cross examine the victims. Though the court 
determined that the defendant had not invoked his right to self 
representation, it nonetheless examined whether the trial court's 
refusal to allow the defendant to cross examine the victims violated 
the right of self representation. Fields[,] 49 F.3d at 1034. 
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court's refusal complied 
with the two part test in McKaskle and the standards set forth in 
Craig. Id. at 1036. Additionally, the court held that "The State's 
interest here in protecting child sexual abuse victims from the 
emotional trauma of being cross-examined by their alleged abuser 
is a least as great as, and likely greater than, the State's interest in 
Craig of protecting children from the emotional harm of merely 
having to testify in their alleged abuser's presence." Id. 
(R., Vol. 2, pp.200-202.) The trial court concluded that, as expressed in 
Estabrook, giving Folk the opportunity to write questions for cross-examination 
satisfies the first prong of the McKaskle test -- allowing the defendant to keep 
control over the case presented to the jury. (Id., p.202; see McKaskle, 465 U.S. 
at 178; Estabrook, 842 P.2d at 1006.) Apart from being able to personally ask 
the questions during the cross-examination of T.R., Folk had control over every 
other aspect of his trial -- meeting the first prong of the McKaskle test. 
The trial court next evaluated the complaint by Folk's standby counsel that 
having him read questions prepared by Folk would make it appear that counsel 
was representing Folk, in violation of the second prong of the McKaskle test. (R., 

















instead followed the reasoning in Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995),13 
explaining: 
The Fields court found that "Denying personal cross-
examination may have inhibited Fields' dignity and autonomy to 
some degree by affecting 'the jury's perception that [he was] 
representing himself,' but, as he would have conducted every other 
portion of the trial, his dignity and autonomy would have been 
'otherwise assured.'" Fields[,J at 1035 (quoting McCaskle [sic], 465 
U.S. at 174). The court found that denying the defendant the right 
to directly cross examine the victim did not violate the Craig and 
McKaskle requirements because it was clear to the jury from the 
rest of the trial that the defendant was representing himself Here, 
the court antiCipates that Defendant will be conducting the entirety 
of his defense. Informing the jury that Defendant prepared the 
questions and having standby counsel conduct the cross 
examination of T.R. will not destroy the jury's perception that 
Defendant is proceeding pro se. 
(R., Vol. 2, p.203 (emphasis added).) The trial court found that having standby 
counsel read the questions prepared by Folk to cross-examine T.R. would not 
"unduly infringe upon [Folks'] right of self representation." (Id.) As noted, Folk 
had control over every other aspect of his trial, therefore, the jury would not have 
been confused over whether he was representing himself. 
Folk has failed to show any error in the trial court's findings in regard to 
the two-prong test of McKaskle. Having Folk write cross-examination questions 
out for his standby counsel to read did not deny Folk the ability to actually control 
the case he presented to the jury. He had total control over every other facet of 
his trial, and drafted the questions asked of the one witness he was not allowed 
13 In Fields, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant's right to personally cross-
examine the witnesses against him could be restricted if the purposes of the self-
representation right would have been "otherwise assured," and if denial of 
personal cross-examination was necessary to further an important public policy. 



















to be present with. Nor did the "written question" procedure ordered to cross-
examine TR. destroy the jury's perception that he was representing himself. 
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. 
Additionally, the trial court mirrored Fields' finding that "'[t]he State's 
interest here in protecting child sexual abuse victims from the emotional trauma 
of being cross-examined by their alleged abuser is at least as great as, and likely 
greater than, the State's interest in Craig of protecting children from the 
emotional harm of merely having to testify in their alleged abuser's presence.'" 
(R., Vol. 2, p.203 (quoting Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036) (emphasis added).) In light of 
the State's great interest in protecting TR. from trauma caused by cross-
examination by Folk, the trauma likely to affect TR. if Folk was allowed to 
personally cross-examine him,14 and because the method of TR.'s cross-
examination meets the McKaskle test, Folk has failed to show the trial court 
erred. 
IV. 
Folk Has Failed To Demonstrate The Trial Court Erred By Its Answer To The 
JUry'S Question About Instruction Sixteen 
A. Introduction 
After the jury began deliberating, the jury sent the judge a written question 
which read: 
14 The factors listed in regard to whether Folk's right to confrontation was 
violated by TR. testifying through closed circuit video apply equally, if not more, 
to Folk's self-representation claim that he should have been permitted to 
personally cross-examine TR. For the sake of brevity, the state relies on its 
















Your Honor, referring to Instruction 16, No. #3; are we 
proving oral, genital contact or is this an issue of any lewd and 
lascivious conduct. Is this a matter of John doing oral sex with 
[T. R.] or any type of sexual advancement. If lewd and lascivious is 
the case, what a [sic] definition of lewd and lascivious. 
(R., Vol. 2, p.270.) The district court sent the jury the following clarifying 
instruction: 
"Lewd and Liscivious [sic] Conduct" is the statutory name for 
a category of sexual touching crimes which include oral-genital 
contact, genital-genital contact, genital-anal contact, manual-genital 
contact, manual-anal contact, oral-anal contact, etc. Here the 
allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact, which is, by 
definition, lewd and lascivious conduct. 
(Tr. p.742, L. 25 - p.743, L.7(emphasis added).) Folk objected to the inclusion of 
the word "etc." by asking the trial judge to remove it his answer. (Tr., p.743, 
Ls.15-18) The trial judge denied Folk's request, explaining he kept "etc." in his 
clarifying instruction in order to track the lewd conduct statute by not only 
including all the combinations listed, but to also reflect that the list is not 
exclusive. 15 (Tr., p.743, L.21- p.744, L.5.) 
On appeal, Folk argues "the district court denied him his right to due 
process of law by instructing the jury that lewd conduct may be committed by 
making any type of sexual advance upon the victim when it refused to remove 
the let cetera' from the clarifying instruction." (Appellant's Brief, p.70.) However, 
Folk misconstrues the trial court's clarifying instruction, and ignores its plain 
directive that the jury only consider the allegation that Folk had oral-genital 
contact with T. R. The instructions did not misstate the law or confuse the jury 
15 I.C. § 18-1508 defines lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor under sixteen as 












about what conduct was alleged to constitute the crime of lewd and lascivious 
conduct. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. 
App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have 
misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 
970,977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d 
1082, 1089 (1998). 
C. Folk Has Failed To Show Any Error, Much Less Prejudicial Error, In The 
Trial Court's Clarifying Instruction 
In essence, the jury's written question to the trial court asked two things: 
(a) what constitutes lewd and lascivious conduct? and (b) what specific act of 
lewd conduct was Folk alleged to have committed? The court's response first 
informed the jury of the specific combinations of physical contact that are 
statutorily defined as lewd conduct, then let the jury know, in attempting to follow 
the statute, that the list is not exclusive by inserting "etc." at the end of the litany. 
(Tr. p.742, L. 25 - p.743, L.5.) In addressing the jury's question about what 
specific lewd conduct Folk was charged with committing ("Is this a matter of John 
doing oral sex with [T.R.] or any type of sexual advancement"), the trial court did 
not mince words: "Here the allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact, 











clarity of that statement needs no interpretation or parsing -- Folk was accused of 
having "oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact" with T.R. 16 
It is well established that jurors are presumed to have followed 
instructions. See, e.g., Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 
612, 661 P.2d 770, 778 (Ct. App. 1983) ([W]here jury instructions are clear, an 
appellate court will presume that the jurors have heeded the instructions given by 
the trial court."); State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 576,585,26 P.2d 131, 135 (1933) ("[I]t 
must be presumed that the jurors observed and applied the instructions given 
them."). There is no basis for believing that the trial court's written answer to the 
jury's question was inadequate where the jury was last given the directive, "Here 
the allegation is oral-genital (mouth to penis) contact, which is, by definition, lewd 
and lascivious conduct." Folk has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial 
court's clarifying instruction. 
16 Folk states: "The district court denied Mr. Folk's request and gave the jurors 
the instruction authorizing it to find sexual advancement included in the conduct 
prohibited under the lewd conduct statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.72.) Folk's 
contention that "etc." in the court's response referred to "any type of sexual 
advancement" mentioned in the jury's question is conclusory and unfounded. 
There is nothing in the trial court's response that connects "etc." to the phrase 
"any type of sexual advancement" in the jury's question. The question asked by 
the jury was in the disjunctive, "Is this a matter of John doing oral sex with [T.R.] 
or any type of sexual advancement." (R., Vol. 2, p.270 (emphasis added).) The 
trial court clarified which of the two types of conduct posited by the jury 
constituted the crime Folk was charged with committing -- "Here the allegation is 



















Folk Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This 
Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Folk has failed to show 
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121,937 
P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. 
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors 
deemed harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Folk's judgment of 
conviction. 
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